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The client's wishes
must not be ignored
because of the profession's love affair with
its own mysteries
by Monroe H. Freedman
It is a singularly good thing, I think,
that law students, and even some
lawyers and law professors, are
questioning with increasing frequency and intensity whether
"professionalism" is incompatible
with human decency-asking, that
is, whether one can be a good
lawyer and a good person at the
same time. I have a special interest
in that question because at least
one perceptive critic, Professor
John T. Noonan, Jr., has drawn the
inference from my book on
lawyers' ethics1 that I do not
believe that a decent, honest perlaw or
son can practice criminal
2
teach others to do so.
Professor Noonan draws that inference, in substantial part, from
my conclusion that a criminal
defense lawyer will sometimes be
compelled knowingly to present a
client's perjury to the court, and to
argue it in summation to the jury. I
base that conclusion on such considerations as the sixth-amendment
right to counsel, the fifthamendment privilege against selfincrimination, and the obligation
of confidentiality, under which the
attorney induces the client to
reveal all relevant information
with assurances that the attorney
will not act upon that information
in a way that might injure the
client. Thus I might ask rhetorically whether Professor Noonan
believes that a good person can induce another to rely upon
assurances of confidentiality, and
then betray those confidences. The
difficulty, of course, is that the
lawyer is frequently faced with
conflicting moral obligations: here,
either to participate knowingly in
the presentation of perjury, or else
which
to violate the client's trust
3
the lawyer has induced.
In view of that kind of moral
dilemma, a cynic might conclude
that one cannot be a good lawyer
and a good person at the same
time. I do not believe, however,
that one can properly be charged
with immorality because one is

presented with a moral dilemma. If
that were so, the human condition
would be one of guilt without
realistic free will, On the contrary,
I believe that in such circumstances, the only immorality
lies in failing to address and to
resolve the moral conflict in a conscientious and responsible manner.
At the same time that I discuss
the issue of professionalism and
personal moral responsibility, I will
also consider an integrally related
question, one that is often expressed in terms of whether it is the
lawyer or the client who should exercise "control" in the relationship

between them. As it is frequentlv
put: is the lawyer iust a "hed
gun," or must the awyer 'obey his
and not thal of his
own conscience
4

client?'

Voicing a viewpoint prevaient in
the profession, lawyers sometimes
use the phrase "client control"
(that is, control of the client by the
lawyer) in expressing their professional pride in maintaining the proper professional relationship. In a
law school commencement address titled "Professionalism in
Lawyering," the Chief judge of a
federal Court of Appeals, Clement

A LAWYER DONT
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F. Haynsworth, stressed the importance of professional competence
in handling a client's affairs; but
Chief Judge Haynsworth went on
to say that of even "greater
moment" than competence on the
part of a lawyer is the fact that
"he serves his clients without being
their servant. He serves to further
the lawful and proper objective of
the client, but the lawyer must
never forget that he is the master.
He is not there to do the client's
bidding. It is for the lawyer to
decide what is morally and legally
right, and, as a professional, he
cannot give in to a client's attempt
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to persuade him to take some
other stand. . . [T]he lawyer must
serve the client's legal needs as the
lawyer sees them, not as the client
sees them. During my years of
practice. .

.

I told [my clients]

what would be done and and firmly rejected suggestions that I do
something else which I felt improper...."5
Surely those are striking phrases to
choose to describe the relationship
of lawyer and client-the lawyer is
"the master" who is "to decide
what is morally.. right," and who
serves the client's needs, but only
"as the lawyer sees them, not as
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the client sees them." Even more
striking is the phrase once used by
Charles Halpern, a sensitive and
dedicated public interest lawyer;
as between the lawyer and the
client, he observed, it is the lawyer
who holds "the whip hand." 6
Thurman Arnold, who was a
prominent practitioner and also a
federal appellate court judge, held
a philosophy similar to judge
Haynsworth's. As described with
approval by former Supreme Court
Justice Abe Fortas, Arnold did not
permit a client "to dictate or determine the strategy or substance of
the representation, even if the
client insisted that his prescription
for the litigation was necessary to
serve the larger cause
to which he
7
was committed."

Critics of the legal profession
argue not that such attitudes and
practices are elitist and paternalistic, but rather that not enough
lawyers abide by them. 8 In an article on "Lawyers as Professionals:
Some Moral Issues," Professor
Richard Wasserstrom recalls John
Dean's list of those involved in the
Watergate cover-up. Dean had
placed an asterisk next to the name
of each of the lawyers on the list,
because he had been struck by the
fact that so many of those implicated were lawyers. Professor
Wasserstrom concludes that the involvement of lawyers in Watergate
was "natural, if not unavoidable,"
the "likely if not inevitable consequence of their legal acculturation." Indeed, on the basis of
Wasserstrom's analysis, the only
matter of wonder is why so many
of those on John Dean's list were
not lawyers. What could possibly
have corrupted the non-lawyers to
such a degree as to have led them
into the uniquely amoral and immoral world of the lawyers? "For at
best," Wasserstrom asserts, "the
lawyer's world is a simplified moral
world; often it is an amoral one;
and more than occasionally, perhaps, an overtly immoral one."9
Professor Wasserstrom holds
that the core of the problem is professionalism and its concomitant,
role-differentiated behavior. Role
differentiation refers, in this context, to situations in which one's
moral response will vary depending upon whether one is acting in a
personal capacity or in a professional, representative one. As
Wasserstrom says, the "nature of
role-differentiated behavior ...
often makes it both appropriate
and desirable for the person in a

The lawyer doesn't always know best

"Far too often
professional attitude
serves to strip
people of autonomy
and power"

particular role to put to one side
considerations of various sortsand especially various moral considerations-that would otherwise
be relevant if not decisive."1 "'
An illustration of the "morally
relevant considerations" Wasserstrom has in mind is the case of a
client who desires to make a will
disinheriting her children because
they opposed the war in Vietnam.
Professor Wasserstrom suggests
that the lawyer should consider
refusing to draft the will because
the client's reason is a "bad" one. 1
But is the lawyer's paternalism
toward the client preferablemorally or otherwise-to the
client's paternalism toward her
children?
We might all be better served,
says Wasserstrom, if lawyers were
to see themselves less as subject to
role-differentiated behavior and
more as subject to the demands of
"the" moral point of view.12 Is it
really that simple? What, for example, of the lawyer whose moral
judgment is that disobedient and
unpatriotic children should be
disinherited? Should that lawyer
refuse to draft a will leaving bequests to children who opposed
the war in Vietnam? If the response
is that we would then have a desirable diversity, would it not be better to have that diversity as a
reflection of the clients' viewpoints, rather than of the lawyers'?
In another illustration, Wasserstrom suggests that a lawyer
should consider refusing to advise
a wealthy client of a tax loophole
provided by the legislature for only
a few wealthy taxpayers. 13 If that
case is to be generalized, it seems
to mean that the legal profession
can properly regard itself as an
oligarchy whose duty is to nullify
decisions made by the people's
14
duly elected representatives.
That is, if the lawyers believe that
particular clients (wealthy or poor)
should not have been given certain
rights, the lawyers are morally
bound to circumvent the legislaMonroe Freedman is senior litigating partner at Bartel, Engelman
and Fishman, New York City.

tive process and to forestall the
judicial process by the simple
device of keeping their clients in
ignorance.
Nor is that a caricature of Wasserstrom's position. The role-differentiated amorality of the lawyer
is valid, he says, "only if the enor-mous degree of trust and confidence in the institutions themselves [that is, in the legislative and
judicial processes] is itself justified." And we are today, he asserts,
"certainly entitled to be quite
skeptical both of the fairness and
of the capacity for self-correction
of our larger institutional mechanisms, including the legal system."" 5 If that is so, would it not be
a non-sequitur to suggest that we
are justified in placing that same
trust and confidence in the morality of lawyers, individually or collectively?
There is "something quite seductive," adds Wasserstrom, about
being able to turn aside so many
ostensibly difficult moral dilemmas with the reply that my job is
not to judge my client's cause, but
16
to represent his or her interest.
Surely, however, it is at least as
seductive to be able to say, "My
moral judgment-or my professional responsibility- requires that
I be your master. Therefore, you
will conduct yourself as I direct
you to."
A more positive view of role-differentiated behavior was provided
in an article in the New York Times
about the tennis star, Manuel
Orantes:
"He has astounded fans by applauding his opponent's good shots
and by purposely missing a point
when he felt that a wrong call by a
linesman has hurt his opponent.
'I like to win,' he said in an interview, 'but I don't feel that I have
won a match if the calls were
wrong. I think if you're playing
Davis Cup or for your country it
might be different, but if I'm playto know I
ing for myself I want
17
have really won."'
In other words, one's moral responsibilities will properly vary depending, among other things, upon
whether one has undertaken special obligations to one's teammates or to one's country.
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Taking a different illustration,
,et us suppose that you are going
about some pressing matter and
your arm is suddenly seized by an
old man with a long gray beard, a
wild look in his eye, and what appears to be an enormous dead bird
hanging around his neck, and he
immediately launches into a
bizarre tale of an improbable
adventure at sea. If he is a stranger
and you are alone on a poorly
lighted street, you may well call the
police. If he is a stranger but
you decide that he is harmless, you
may simply go on to your other
responsibilities. If he is a friend or
a member of your family, you may
feel obligated to spend some time
listening to the ancient mariner, or
even to confer with others as to
how to care for him. Ifyou are a
psychiatric social worker, you may
act in yet some other way, and that
action may depend upon whether
you are on duty at your place of
employment, or hurrying so that
you will not be late to a weddingand in the latter case, your decision may vary depending upon
whether the wedding is someone
else's or your own.
Surely there can be no moral objection to those radically different
courses of conduct, or to the fact
that they are governed substantially by personal, social and professional context, that is, by roledifferentiation. One simply cannot
be expected, in any rational moral
system, to react to every stranger
in the same way in which one may
be obligated to respond to a member of one's family or to a friend.
In an interesting and thoughtprovoking article, Professor
Charles Fried has analogized the
lawyer to a friend-a "special-purpose" or "limited-purpose" friend
"in regard to the legal system." The
lawyer is seen to be "someone who
enters into a personal relation with
you-not an abstract relation as
under the concept of justice." That
means, Fried says, that "like a
friend, [the lawyer] acts in your interests, not his own; or rather he
adopts your interests as his own." 18
The moral foundation of Fried's
justification of that special-purpose friendship is the sense of self,

the moral concepts of "personality, identity and liberty." He notes
that social institutions are so complex that without the assistance of
an expert adviser, an ordinary lay
person cannot exercise the personal autonomy to which he or she
is morally and legally entitled
within the system. "Without such
an adviser, the law would impose
constraints on the lay citizen (unequally at that) which it is not entitled to impose explicitly." The
limited purpose of the lawyer's
friendship, therefore, is "to
preserve and foster the client's
autonomy within the law."'
Similarly, Professor Sylvia A.
Law has written, "A lawyer has a
special skill and power to enable
individuals to know the options
available to them in dealing with a
particular problem, and to assist
individuals in wending their way
through bureaucratic, legislative
or judicial channels to seek vindication for individual claims and interests. Hence lawyers have a special ability to enhance human
autonomy and self-control." She
adds, however, that "far too often,
professional attitude, rather than
serving to enhance individual autonomy and self-control, serves to
strip people of autonomy and
power. Rather than encouraging
clients and citizens to know and
control their own options and lives,
the legal profession discourages
client participation and control of
their own legal claims. "2(

The essence of Professor Fried's
argument does not require the
metaphor of friendship, other than
as an analogy in justifying the
lawyer's role-differentiation. It was
inevitable, however, that Fried's
critics would give the metaphor of
friendship the same emphasis that
Fried himself does. Perhaps inadvertently, therefore, they miss the
essential point he makes, that
human autonomy is a fundamental
moral concept that must determine, in substantial part, the
answers that we give to some of
the most difficult issues regarding
the lawyer's ethical role.
Thus, in a response to Fried, Professors Edward A. Dauer and Ar-

thur Allen Leff make some perceptive and devastating comments
about the limited-purpose logic of
Fried's metaphor of friendship. At
the same time, however, Dauer and
Leff express their own views of the
lawyer's role and character, views
which I find to be both cynical and
superficial. They describe an "invariant element" of the lawyerclient relationship in the following
terms:
"The client comes to a lawyer to
be aided when he feels he is being
treated, or wishes to treat someone
else, not as a whole other person,
but (at least in part) as a threat or
hindrance to the client's satisfaction in life. The client has fallen, or
wishes to thrust someone else, into
the impersonal hands of a just and
angry bureaucracy. When one
desires help in those processes
whereby and wherein people are
treated as means and not as ends,
then one comes to lawyers, to us.
Thus, if you feel the need for a
trope to express what a lawyer
largely is, perhaps this will do: a
lawyer is a person who on behalf of
some people treats other people
the way bureaucracies treat all
people-as nonpeople. Most
lawyers
are21
free-lance
bureaucrats...."
Despite that caricature, Dauer
and Leff manage to conclude that
"a good lawyer can be a good person." They do so, however, by
defining "a good person" in limited
terms: "In our view the lawyer
achieves his 'goodness' by beingprofessionally-no rottener than
the generality of people acting, so
to speak, as amateurs." 22 The best
that can be said for that proposition, I believe, is that it is not likely
to stop students with any moral
sensitivity from continuing to ask
whether it is indeed possible for a
good lawyer to be a good person.
The most serious flaw in Professor Fried's friendship metaphor
is that it is misleading when the
moral focus is on the point at
which the lawyer-client relationship begins. Friendship, like love,
seems simply to happen, or to
grow, often in stages of which we
may not be immediately con-
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The choice of client
is an aspect of
the lawyer's free will.
It can be subjected
to moral scrutiny
and criticism

scious. Both in fact and in law,
however, the relationship of lawyer
and client is a contract, which is a
significantly different relationship,
in a significantly different
formed
23
way.

Unlike friendship, a contract involves a deliberate choice by both
parties at a particular time. Thus,
when Professor Fried says that the
lawyer's moral liberty "to take up
what kind of practice he chooses
and to take up or decline what
clients he will is an aspect of the
moral liberty of self to enter into
personal relations freely," 24 the
issue of the morality of the decision to enter the relationship is
blurred by the amorphous manner
in which friendships are formed.
Since entering a lawyer-client contract is a more deliberate, conscious decision, that decision can
justifiably be subjected to a more
searching moral scrutiny.
In short, a lawyer should indeed
have the freedom to choose clients
on any standard he or she deems
appropriate. As Professor Fried
points out, the choice of client is
an aspect of the lawyer's free will,
to be exercised within the realm of
the lawyer's moral autonomy. That
choice, therefore, cannot properly
be coerced.
Contrary to Fried's view, however, it can properly be subjected to
the moral scrutiny and criticism of
others, particularly those who feel
morally compelled to persuade the
lawyer to use his or her professional
training and skills in ways that the
critics consider to be more consissocial or profestent with personal
25
sional ethics.

As I have stressed elsewhere,
however, once the lawyer has
assumed responsibility to represent a client, the zealousness of
that representation cannot be
tempered by the lawyer's moral
judgments of the client or of the
client's cause. 26 That point is of importance in itself, and is worth
stressing also because it is one of
the considerations that a lawyer
should take into account in making
the initial decision whether to
lawyerenter into a particular
27
client relationship.

In disagreeing with Professor
Wasserstrom's criticism of role-differentiation, I did not mean to suggest that role-differentiation has
not produced a degree of amoralitv, and even immorality, in the
practice of many lawyers. The
problem, as I see it, is expressed in
the news item I quoted earlier regarding Manuel Orantes. Playing
for himself, Mr Orantes has earned
an enviable reputation, not only
for his athletic prowess, but also
for his good sportsmanship -if you
will, for his morality in his relations
with his adversaries. Yet when he
plays with teammates and for his
country, he adopts different standards of conduct
I think that Mr. Orantes is wrong,
in a way that many lawyers frequently are wrong. I do not mean
that in Davis Cup play he is not
bound by special, voluntarilyassumed obligations to others. On
the contrary, he is bound by his
role as teammate and countryman
to accept the decision of his teammates, which may well be that
each player should play to win,
without relinquishing any advantage that the rules of the game and
the calls of the judges allow.
Where Orantes is wrong, however,
is in preempting that decision, in
assuming that their decision is that
winning is all. Perhaps if he actually put the choice to them, Orantes'
teammates would decide that they
would prefer to achieve, for themselves and for their country, the
kind of character and reputation
for decency and fairness that
Orantes has earned for himself.
Perhaps they would not decide
that way. The choice, however, is
theirs, and it is a denial of their
humanity to assume the less noble
choice and to act on that assumption without consultation.
In day-to-day law practice, the
most common instances of amoral
or immoral conduct by lawyers are
those occasions on which we
preempt our clients' moral judgments. That occurs in two ways:
most commonly we assume that
our function is to maximize the
client's material or tactical position in every way that is legally permissible. Since our function is not
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to judge the client's cause, but to
represent the client's interests, we
tend to assume the worst regarding
the client's desires. Much less frequently, I believe, we will decide
that a particular course of conduct
is morally preferable, even though
not required legally, and will
follow that course on the client's
behalf. In either event, we fail in
our responsibility to maximize the
client's autonomy by providing the
client with the fullest advice and
counsel, legal and moral, so that
the client can make the most informed choice possible.2 8
Let me give a commonplace illustration. Two experienced and
conscientious lawyers, A and B,
once asked me to help them to
resolve an ethical problem. They
represented a party for whom they
were negotiating a complex contract involving voluminous legal
documents, The attorneys on the
other side were insistent upon
eliminating a particular guarantee
provision, and A and B had been
authorized by their client to forego
the guarantee if the other side was
adamant. The other lawyers had
overlooked, however, that the
same guarantee appeared elsewhere in the documents. where it
was more broadly and unambiguously stated. Having agreed to
eliminate the guarantee provision,
with specific reference to a particular clause on a particular page,
were A and B obligated to call the
attention of opposing counsel to
the similar clause on a different
page? Or, on the contrary, were
they obligated, as A put it, "to
represent our client's interest,
rather than to educate the lawyers
on the other side?"
Each of the lawyers was satisfied
that, if he were negotiating for
himself, he would unquestionably
point out the second guarantee
clause to the other party. Moreover, each of them was more attentive to, and concerned about, questions of professional responsibility
than most lawyers probably areeach of them, that is, was highly
sensitive to the question of personal responsibility in a professional system. Yet it had occurred
to neither of them that their profes-

sional responsibility was not to
resolve the issue between themselves, but rather to present the
issue to the client for resolution. 29
Our discussion thus far has
related to decisions that are clearly in the moral or ethical realm.
What of tactical decisions? Are
those significantly different and
therefore within the lawyer's
ultimate control?
At one time I had the notion,
based on fantasy, that Alger Hiss
had no involvement with Whittaker Chambers' nefarious activities, but that Hiss' wife did.
Assuming such a case, imagine Mr.
Hiss' lawyer advising him that the
only way to defend himself would
be to tell the truth about his wife's
involvement, and Hiss replying
that, in no way, directly or indirectly, was his wife to be brought into
the case, even if it meant an erroneous conviction for himself In
those circumstances, I find it hard
to believe that even Clement
Haynsworth or Thurman Arnold
would insist upon conducting the
case in such a way
as to implicate
0
the client's wife.3
Arguably, however, that case
represents a moral decision rather
than a tactical one. On the orit
hand, there is the client's love for
and loyalty to his wife. On the
other, there is the possibility of a
wrongful conviction, and the
likelihood that the client will give
misleading, or
even false,
testimony in the effort to avoid implicating his wife.
A recent case in New Jersey,
State v. Pratts, 31 would seem to
come as close as possible to requiring a tactical decision unencumbered by moral considerations. In that case, the lawyer
representing a criminal defendant
had interviewed a witness who had
given the lawyer a statement
helpful to the defense. The lawyer
learned, however, that shortly
thereafter the witness had given
the prosecutor a different statement, damaging to the defendant.
The lawyer's decision, therefore,
was that the witness should not be
called. For similar reasons, of
(Please turn to page 51)

Since our function

is not to judge
the client's cause,
but to represent
the client's interests,
we tend to assume
the worst regarding
the client's desires

involved-to get at the relevant
sociological information, made his
decision without information and
perspectives that would have been
available to anyone taking an
undergraduate course in the field.
Whether Judge Roth's decision was
the correct one is not at issue here;
rather the point is that the decision
was appallingly uninformed by
social science despite the judge's
strong efforts to incorporate social
science into the proceedings and
the decision.
And, incidentally, about that part
of his decision which was overruled, 14 it does not take social
science to realize that the flight to
the suburbs is the most powerful
segregationist tool in our society.
The lines which purport to be city
boundaries are far greater restrictions than "separate but equal."
Judges may sit secure in their
bailiwicks in Flossmoor and
Newton and manipulate other
people's children in other people's
neighborhoods in the name of
enlightened social science. But
when they do so, they indeed
violate both social science and its
theory, as well as the most obvious
common sense experience of driv-ing across the street beyond the city
boundary. Again, however, I would
assert that the contribution of
social science to a metropolitan approach to policy-and to policyrelated judicial decisions-ought

knowing best

to be auxiliary, supplementary and
a minor footnote, rather than an occasion for a disgraceful oversimplification of a very modest intellectual discipline in the
ideological crucible-which some
of our adversary proceedings have
become.
A word also ought to be said
about the weakness of most social
science indicators. We do our best
with our instruments, and, if I may
say so, some of our instruments are
pretty good and getting better; but
they are not microscopes or radio
telescopes or any of the other fantastically elaborate and precise instruments of some other disciplines. No one should begin to think
that they are.
I am endlessly amazed by the
conflict over IQ tests. How could
anyone take such an unreliable and
indeed substantively undefined indicator all that seriously? As a
general and vague measure of certain kinds of undefined intellectual
abilities that are not all that important save in very gross ways, maybe
IQ has some utility. But when I
heard that the Irish were a standard
deviation beneath the English in IQ
scores in the British Isles, I said to
hell with IQ. The point is, of course,
that if judges and lawyers permit
themselves to be turther seduced
into taking sociological evidence
with terrible seriousness in the

courtroom, they are going to have
to open up the whole can of worms
of social science instrumentation.
Should sociology fold up then?
Well, probably no great harm would
be done if it did, save to the families
and dependents of sociologists. But
one could respond with the ad
hom.,nem but always effective argument of "you're another!" Should
law fold up because it is often
wrong and because its history is
made up mostly of reversals? Indeed, if only the successful professions are allowed to stay in business, I fear the mathematicians will
possess the earth- and then only
because no one else can understand
their failures.
As a rule of thumb, the more
modest and restrained the sociologist, the more low-key his findings,
the more gray his world, the more
cautious and hesitant his policy suggestions (something like, "Well,
metropolitan, voluntary, subsidized integration might help a little, I think."), the more likely he is to
be a good witness in a court of law.
Whatyou will getfrom him, and you
should value it, is a well-educated
opinion and a sophisticated perspective. Do not expect anything
else of him, for his discipline was
never really designed to produce
miraculous cures of social ills; and
the good Lord knows that it has not
surprised us by coming up with any
hr
such cures.

(Continued from page 339

course, the prosecutor also refrained from calling the witness.
The defendant disagreed with
his lawyer. Fully aware of the risks
of calling the witness, the defendant decided that that witness was
part of the case he wanted
presented on his behalf, Apprised
of the situation, the trial judge accepted the decision of the defense
attorney, and the witness was not
called. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the Superior Court of
New Jersey affirmed. The court
stated the issue to be not "whether
there was an abuse of discretion"
by the trial judge, but "who was

responsible for the conduct of the
defense." The court held that
"when a defendant accepts
representation by counsel, that
counsel has the authority to make
the necessary decisions as to the
''
management of the case." 2
Quoting a federal appeals decision, the court added that the
defendant "has a right to be cautioned, advised, and served by
[court-appointed] counsel so that
he will not be a victim of his poverty. But he has no right... to dictate
the procedural course of his
representation."3
I think the court was wrong. At
issue is not the lawyer's day in

court, but the defendant's-the
defendant's right to trial, right to
due process of law, and right to
counsel 34 As the Supreme Court
has noted, under the Sixth Amendment, "the right to defend is given
directly to the accused, for it is he
if
who suffers the consequences
35
the defense fails."

Indeed, I would put the Pratts
case, too, in the realm of morality.
In a society such as ours, an essential purpose of a criminal trial is to
manifest respect for the dignity of
the individual. 3 Further, as we
have already noted, a central element of human dignity is personal
autonomy, particularly in matters

that affect our own lives as
substantially as those in which
lawyers are needed for assistance.
Moreover, the "assistance" of
counsel that is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment is just that. In
the words of the Supreme Court,
"lAin assistant, however expert, is
still an assistant. The language and
spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the
other defense tools guaranteed by
the Amendment, shall be an aid to
Othera willing defendant...
wise, "counsel is not an assistant,
but a master," with the result that
the right to make a defense is
"stripped of the personal character
the Amendment inupon 3which
7

fessional pride, in the sense that
the lawyer does not want the judge
or any colleagues present to think
that he or she is so unskilled as to
have called a witness who is so
vulnerable to cross-examination.
Insofar as the lawyer's response
would be that the lawyer's real
concern is with the client's welfare,
I think it is another instance of
misplaced paternalism.
One of a just society's essential
values is respect for the dignity of
each member of that society. Essential to each individual's dignity
is the maximization of his or her
autonomy or, as Pope John XXIII
expressed it, "the right to act freely

As against those weighty considerations of human dignity and
autonomy, which find expression
in the Constitution, what reasons
are there for the attorney to control such a decision? In Pratts,
there would have been some saving of time at the trial. On the
other hand, in a case in which the
defendant prefers not to call a particular witness whom the lawyer
wants to call, the client's decision
would conserve time. In either
event, the time element would not
appear to constitute a compelling
reason to deprive the client of the
opportunity to make the decision
in a matter of such importance to
him. I suspect, in fact, that the real
reason lawyers prefer to make the
final decision, and judges are inclined to give it to them, is pro-

[and] ...on his own decision. '

sists."

and responsibly ... chiefly on his

own responsibility and initiative
38

In

order to exercise that responsibility and initiative, each person is entitled to know his or her rights
against society and against other
individuals, and to decide whether
to seek fulfillment of those rights
through the processes of law. The
lawyer, by virtue of his or her training and skills, has a legal monopoly
on access to the legal system, and
on
monopoly
a practical
knowledge about the law. Legal
advice and assistance are often indispensable, therefore, to the effective exercise of individual
autonomy.
Accordingly, it is both professional and moral for the attorney
to assist clients to maximize their
autonomy by counselling them
candidly and fully regarding their

legal rights and moral responsibilities as the lawyer perceives
them, and by assisting them in carrying out their lawful decisions.
But it is both unprofessional and
immoral to deprive clients of their
autonomy by denying them information regarding their legal rights,
by otherwise preempting their
moral choices, or by depriving
them of the ability to carry out
their lawful decisions.
Until the lawyer-client relationship is entered into, however-until, that is, the lawyer induces
another to rely upon his or her professional knowledge and skillsthe lawyer ordinarily acts entirely
within the scope of his or her own
autonomy. Barring extraordinary
circumstances, 'i therefore, the attorney is free to exercise his or her
personal judgment as to whether
to represent a particular client.
Since a moral choice is implicated
in such a decision, however, others
are entitled to judge and to
criticize it on moral grounds.
Finally, those of us who teach
law have a primary professional
obligation to explicate the moral
aspects of the law in general and of
lawyers' ethics in particular.
If we-teachers and lawyersconscientiously carry out those
personal and professional respon
sibilities, then I do believe that professionalism is consistent with
decency, and I therefore conclude
that one can indeed be a good
lawyer and a moral person at the
ir
same time.
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